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T HERE can be little doubt that the American justice system is
failing to meet the needs of the ordinary citizen. Courts are
clogged and overloaded.' Delays in litigation are no longer the ex-
ception, but rather the norm. Not only for the poor, but even for
large corporations, the decision to litigate has become a function of
cost, not injury.2
These complaints are not new. Indeed, some suggest that the
problem is cyclical. 3 Although few would argue that the grass is nec-
" Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School; Visiting Fellow in Legal
Policy at the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C. B.A., M.A. University of
Pennsylvania 1967; B. Phil. (Oxen) Oxford University 1970; J.D. University of Penn-
sylvania, 1973. The author served as a member of the Board of Directors of the Legal
Services Corporation, Washington, D.C. between 1975-78.
This essay is an expanded version of a lecture on the Litigious Society given
before the Heritage Foundation in March, 1983. A version of this paper was also
delivered to a colloquium sponsored by the Administrative Assistant to Chief Justice
Burger, Mark Cannon, who provided significant encouragement to this essay.
1. For an example of Chief Justice Burger's long-term criticism of judicial over-
load, see Burger,Annual Report on the State of theJudickiy, 69 A.B.A. J. 442 (1983). The
Chief Justice has asserted that crowded dockets are "perhaps the most important...
problem facing the judiciary." Id. at 442-45. See also Brennan, Some Thoughts on the
Supreme Court's Workload, 66 JUDICATURE 230 (1983) (the endurance of the Supreme
Court is being taxed to its limits by the number and complexity of cases currently
decided); Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177, 178 (1983)
("The Supreme Court is now processing more litigation than ever before."). Seegener-
ally H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN & B. BUCHOLZ, DELAY IN COURT (2d ed. 1978); Cooke,
Highways and Byways of Dispute Resolution, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 611 (1981). For a
statistical analysis ofjudici4 l overload, see note 11 infra.
2. For a discussion of the costs of litigation and corporate responses to these
costs, see note 55 infra.
3. One commentator, for instance, has observed that "[n]either the discontent
with the relationship between types of dispute and adjudication style nor the concern
with reorganizing the judicial management of minor conflict is new. Indeed, the
contemporary movement displays parallels with reforms proposed and instituted be-
tween 1900 and 1930." Harrington, Delegaltatton Reform Movements.- An H-htorzial
Analysio, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 35-36 (R. Abel ed. 1982) [herein-
after cited as 1 INFORMAL JUSTICE].
For commentary on American litigiousness during an earlier era, see H. ST. J.
DE CR VECOEUR, SKETCHES OF EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 76-78 (Bourdin,
Gabriel & Williams eds. 1925) (since organized religion did not play a major role in
frontier life, Americans depended upon the law to regulate daily life). See also A. DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 284 (H. Reeve trans. 1899) ("Scarcely any
question arises in the United States which does not become, sooner or later, a subject
of judicial debate. ... ).
(923)
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essarily greener in other countries or cultures,4 criticism of the United
State's system of justice must be taken seriously and proposed solu-
tions investigated fully.
The most frequent and alarming of these complaints against the
civil justice system alleges the failure of its formal dispute resolution
mechanisms to deal adequately with the increasing incidence of liti-
gation. The litigation explosion 5 has been styled as a threat to capi-
talism, 6 a national disease,7 and a pollutant of our traditional social
values." A recent book on the subject by Jethro Lieberman suggests
that the American legal system has become awash in an orgy of litiga-
tion, 9 and, indeed, this is the conventional wisdom.' 0 All available
4. The problem of litigiousness is not limited to the United States. Complaints
have also been made regarding the incidence of litigation in, for example, Israel and
Canada. See Shetreet, The Overburdening of the Supreme Court of Israel The Problems, The
Effects and the Remedies, in ISRAELI REPORTS TO THE TENTH INTERNATIONAL CON-
GRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 56, 79 (S. Goldstein ed. 1978) ("[T]he per capita rate
of civil cases filed in Israel in all courts is one of the highest in the world.").
For selected comparative statistical figures showing the increasing caseloads of
the courts of Canada, England, the United States, and Israel, see Shetreet, The Limits
of ExpeditiousJustce, in EXPEDITIOUS JUSTICE 1 (Papers of the Canadian Institute for
the Administration of Justice 1979).
5. See Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1975). This
commentator suggests that "as implausible as it may appear, exponential extrapola-
tion of increases over the last decade suggests that by the early 21st century the fed-
eral appellate courts alone will decide approximately 1 million cases each year. That
bench would include over 5,000 active judges, and the Federal Reporter would ex-
pand by more than 1,000 volumes each year." Id. But see D. TRUBEK,J. GROSSMAN,
W. FELSTINER, H. KRITZER, & A. SARAT, CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT:
FINAL REPORT S-17 (U. of Wisc. 1983) (referring to Marc Galanter's view that
alarming reports on the rate of litigation in the U.S. are "based more on popular
myth than careful analysis of the data").
6. See Silberman, Will Lawyerng Strangle Democratic Capitalism?, REGULATION,
Mar.-Apr. 1978, at 15.
Capitalism and democracy, in common, stand for competition for the alle-
giance of the public as either consumers or voters. The legal process, on the
other hand, is fundamentally antithetical to both because the competition is
for the ear of a government official who will determine the superior claim
among litigants . . . in terms of priority of rights.
Id. at 16.
7. See Manning, Hyperlexis" Our NationalDisease, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 767 (1971).
Manning defines the legal explosion as "America's national disease-the pathological
condition caused by an overactive law-making gland." Id. at 767.
8. Ehrlich, Legal Pollution, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1976 (Magazine), at 17 (increased
recourse to the courts is costly, and frequently fails to solve social problems).
9. J. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY, 3-8 (1981).
10. The rate of litigation is popularly attributed to the litigious nature of Ameri-
cans. Indeed, the number of lawyers per capita in the United States suggests that
American society is structured to resolve disputes through litigation. See, e.g.,
Schwartz, Reorgan'zation of the Legal Profession, 58 TEx. L. REV. 1269, 1270 (1980)
(indicating there is one lawyer for every 440 persons in the U.S., and predicting there
will be one lawyer for every 270 persons in California by 1984). In contrast, there is
only one lawyer for every 10,989 persons in Japan. Abel, Toward a Political Economy of
[Vol. 28: p. 923
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statistics point towards a real and serious increase in the litigation
incidence rate. 1
The litigation explosion threatens to overwhelm the capacity of
our judicial institutions to respond adequately to the needs of our
society. An understanding of this crisis can be achieved only through
the questioning of a number of principles central to our justice sys-
tem. This essay will explore the contours of these questions and eval-
uate various responses to the litigation crisis. By their nature, the
solutions suggested can be only tentative.
Lawyers, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 1117, 1123 n.24 (citing Galanter, M~ega-Law and Mega-
Lawyering in the Contemporaty Untied States, reprinted in SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFES-
SIONS 176 n.20 (R. Dingwall & P. Lewis eds. 1983)).
11. See, e.g., ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FED-
ERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS (Sept. 30, 1982) [hereinafter cited as STATIS-
TICS, 1982]; DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR U.S. (1974-1980) [hereinafter cited as
MANAGEMENT STATISTICS, 1974 etc.]
In 1982, 245,656 cases were filed in U.S. district courts, a 13% increase over cases
filed in 1981, a 53% increase over those filed in 1975 and an astonishing 93% increase
over those filed in 1970. Civil filings increased 14.5% in 1982 over 1981; criminal
filings in the same period increased 5.8%. STATISTICS, 1982; MANAGEMENT STATIS-
TICS 1974.
The increase in the number of filings in the circuit courts of appeals has recently
slowed, but a dramatic increase is evident over the past two decades. In 1982, 27,768
cases were filed, an increase of only 2.5% over the 27,101 cases filed in 1981. STATIS-
TICS, 1982. However, the 1982 filings represent a 138% increase over the number of
1970 filings. MANAGEMENT STATISTICS, 1974.
In contrast, the workload data for New York State courts, indicates that the rise
in civil litigation has been very low. Compare SECOND ANN. REPORT OF CHIEF AD-
MINISTRATOR OF COURT (1980) with THIRD ANN. REPORT OF CHIEF ADMINISTRA-
TOR OF COURT (1981). Increased criminal caseloads account largely for New York
State court congestion. In the first forty weeks of 1981, filing of criminal indictments
was 20 percent over that of the corresponding period in 1980. In 1980, over two
million indictments, actions, and proceedings were filed in New York State trial
courts. Cooke, Community Dispute Resolution Centers Program Inaugurated, 54 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 150 (1982).
The crisis in the California courts is deepening as well. "[T]he system . . .may
be heading for collapse unless something is done to ease the staggering caseloads in
the civil courtrooms. . . . [J]udges in [Los Angeles County] face a 72,000 case back-
log, which is growing at about 1,000 cases each month." Pressman & Morrow, The
72,000 Case Overload, L.A. LAW., Sept. 1981, at 18.
The congestion in the courts is attributed not only to a rise in case filings but
also to the delay in case dispositions. During 1982, the overall pending caseload in
the U.S. courts of appeals dropped 1.8%, although five circuits did experience in-
creased caseloads. The Second Circuit sustained the most significant increase, with a
pending caseload in 1982 that was 15.8% over that of 1981. MANAGEMENT STATIS-
TICS, 1981, at 1. In the federal district courts, the number of civil cases pending
reached an all-time high figure of 211,964 on Sept. 30, 1982. This represents an
increase of 8.4% over the 195,525 cases pending as of Sept. 30, 1981. Id. at 6.
The number of civil cases pending in the long term (3 years or more) in the
circuit and district courts fell 3.4% between June 30 and September 30, 1982. Id. at
10. However, lengthy and complex litigation remains a phenomenon of deep con-
cern. See Riley, When the Case Has a Long Fuse, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 12, 1983, at 1, 10-11.
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I. SOURCES OF THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION
A. Do We As a Society Really Want People to Exercise Their Legal
Rights?
A cornerstone of liberal capitalism is a concept entitled "the rule
of law" through which the individual citizen is ensured equal applica-
tion of the laws, and protected from arbitrary state encroachment
into private affairs. Many have heralded the success of the rule of
law's formalist procedural protections. 12 Others, in particular critical
legal theorists, have rejected its validity. 13 These critical theorists as-
sert that liberal capitalism, through "the rule of law," is incapable of
achieving the goal of protecting citizens from governmental encroach-
12. See, e.g., E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE
BLACK ACT (1975). This noted British historian observed as follows:
[T]here is a difference between arbitrary power and the rule of law. We
ought to expose the shams and inequities which may be concealed beneath
[the] law. But the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions
upon power and the defense of the citizen from power's all-intrusive claims,
seems to me to be an unqualified human good.
Id. at 267.
The centrality of the rule of law, of course, is a prime concern of conservative
political theorists. See, e.g.,, F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
Nothing distinguishes more clearly conditions in a free country from those
in a country under arbitrary government than the observance in the former
of the great principles known as the Rule of Law. Stripped of all technicali-
ties, this means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed
and announced beforehand-rules which make it possible to foresee with
fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circum-
stances and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.
Id. at 72 (footnote omitted).
13. For discussion of the critical legal theorists' views, see Teachout, Light zn
Ashes: The Problem of "Respectfor the Rule of Law " in American Legal History, 53 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 241 (1978); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561
(1983). See also Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theo,, in D. KAiRYS, THE POLI-
TICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 281-93 (1982). Critical legal theory is char-
acterized by a "preoccupation with law as a force for the destruction of those human
values we hold most sacred in a civilization-of individual dignity, equality, and
community. . . . [L]aw is seen primarily as a vehicle for the manipulation by the
powerful in society of the power of the powerless. ... Teachout, supra at 244-45.
A self-confessed intellectual "trashing" of the rule of law has been seen as a good in
itself. Freeman, Truth and Mystiftcation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229, 1230-31
(1981) ("The goal of trashing . . . is to expose possibilities more truly expressing
reality, possibilities of fashioning a future that might at least partially realize a sub-
stantive notion of justice instead of the abstract, rightsy, traditional, bourgeois no-
tions of justice that generate so much of the contradictory scholarship"). A
fundamental consequence of such demystification, however, is a rejection of that
"simple empirical truth that where there is genuine respect for the rule of law and the
principles that underlie it, brutality and oppression cannot survive." Teachout,
supra, at 280. One sometimes wonders if this obsessive delight in demystification is
anything more than "doing bad things to daddy" as Duncan Kennedy admits in an
analogous context. Kennedy, Thoughts About Corporate Law Practice 30 (Root
Room Talk, Feb. 1980).
[Vol. 28: p. 923
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ment, and that the concept of neutral principles is used to manipulate
legal relations so as to favor one social group over another rather than
to ensure full exercise of legal rights.
14
Litigation to enforce or vindicate public rights and entitlements
is particularly relevent to this dispute. Although equal access to jus-
tice is an essential part of "the rule of law's" promise of neutral appli-
cation of legal standards, our government has been unable to provide
effective access to the justice system for all citizens. This fact remains
true despite government subsidy of legal services.15 Similarly, while
our governmental structure provides all citizens with a variety of con-
stitutional and statutory rights, the state might not be able to provide
these rights if, in fact, all citizens with access to the system demand
them. This condition is manifested by, and accomodated through,
"innovations" such as plea bargaining. All persons have a right to
put the state to its proof in a criminal proceeding.' 6 Yet, if all defend-
ants chose to do so rather than to plea bargain, the criminal justice
system would collapse. Thus, in a functional sense, the right to a jury
trial is predicated on the expectation that few will utilize it. 17 A simi-
lar situation exists regarding the right to a fair hearing in social wel-
14. See, e.g., Spitzer, Dialectcs of Formal and Informal Control, in 1 THE POLITICS
OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 167, 174-78.
15. Dooley and Houseman, Refine, Don't Destroy Legal Serovies, 69 A.B.A. J. 607
(1983) (The author urges that the Reagan administration's proposed elimination of
funding for legal services will leave the poor without the ability to enforce their
rights). See also M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 124-25 (1980) (the national legal
services programs should be expanded to include the middle class).
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. . . ." Id. See also Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) ("trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the Amer-
ican scheme of justice").
17. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that plea bargaining
plays a crucial role in the management of the criminal justice system, noting that
"[dlisposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the
process but a highly desirable part. . . ." Santobello v. United States, 404 U.S. 257,
261 (1971). The Court declared that plea bargaining should be encouraged because
"[i]f every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the
Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges
and court facilities." Id. at 260.
It has been argued that the government utilizes plea bargaining to coerce de-
fendants into not demanding a trial and to permit faster disposition of cases. See
Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargainig, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 13-21 (1978). Similarly,
it has been suggested that "jury trial[s] .. .have become so cumbersome and expen-
sive that our society refuses to provide [them]. Rather than reconsider our overly
elaborate trial procedure, we press most criminal defendants to forego even the more
expeditious form of trial that defendants once were freely afforded as a matter of
right." Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its Histoy, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41 (1979).
Some theorists are even more critical: "[I]nducement of a guilty plea is not merely a
way of shortening the criminal process. Instead, pressures to plead guilty have been
used to secure convictions that could not otherwise be obtained. . . . Clearly, plea
bargaining. . . raises difficult ethical and constitutional issues." Finkelstein, 4 Statis-
1982-831
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fare entitlement disputes.18 Efforts by welfare activists during the
"war on poverty" to demand the full panoply of procedural rights1 9
resulted in such pressure on the welfare system that certain entitle-
ments were eventually retrenched.
20
The fact that all citizens with a grievance do not pursue their
disputes through the formal system of justice, and many others choose
not to exercise every right available, is not as patently offensive as
some would have us believe. We tend to forget that procedural rights
not only inhibit bureaucrats from taking advantage of citizens, but
also inhibit governmental exercise of discretionary compassion.
Many European welfare theorists are skeptical about the American
procedural rights approach for this very reason.2 1 More pointedly,
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, in his wholesale critique of the litigious and
tical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practlies in the Federal Courts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 293, 309
(1975).
18. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (procedural due process requires
notice and evidentiary hearing prior to termination of government benefits).
19. See L. JACKSON & W. JOHNSON, PROTEST BY THE POOR 114 (1974);
RABAGLIAL & BIRNBAUM, ORGANIZATIONS OF WELFARE CLIENTS, COMMUNITY DE-
VELOPMENT IN THE MOBILIZATION FOR YOUTH EXPERIENCE 102-36 (Weissman ed.
1969).
20. In response to the overwhelming increase in requests during the 1960's by
militant welfare recipients for fair hearings on special grant entitlements, local and
state governments eliminated the discretionary special grant system, replacing it with
a universal flat grant system with lower allotments than those possible under an indi-
vidualized need-based allocation. See F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S
MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 303-07 (1977). In addition,
the right to a fair hearing established by Goldberg v. Kelly, may have induced more
rigorous initial eligibility determinations. See J. HANDLER, PROTECTING THE SOCIAL
SERVICE CLIENT 69-70 (1979). See also Brill, The Uses and Abuses of Legal Assstance, 31
PUB. INTEREST 38, 43-44 (1973) (even a decision which was intended to favor welfare
recipients may backfire; defeat of the 1-year residency requirement for California
welfare benefits triggered cut-backs which actually decreased the number of welfare
recipients). But see Denvir, Towards a Pohtcal Theory of Publ'c Interest Litigation, 54
N.C.L. REV. 1133, 1139 (1976) ("Probably the very presence of the mechanism for
review [mandated by Goldberg v. Kelly] makes administrators making eligibility deter-
minations more careful during their original review of the facts and somewhat less
likely to construe close cases against the recipient").
In landlord-tenant relations, although lawyers were successful in using hitherto
untapped formal procedures to the advantage of their tenant-clients, these substan-
tive gains were limited by the hostility of the Housing Court judiciary. Lazerson, In
the Halls ofjustice, the Only justlie is in the Halls, in I THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL
JUsTICE,supra note 3, at 119, 145-48. Enforcement of housing codes has not grown in
effectiveness; limited funds have nullified the ability of the courts to order effective
remedies to enforce housing standards; procedural rules have limited the capacity of
the Housing and Development Administration to use the Housing Court against
landlords; and the rules for serving landlords in enforcement actions are more rigid
than those for serving tenants, therefore benefiting landlords. Id. at 157.
21. Various British welfare theorists take the view that a focus on rights can
prevent "a flexibility of response to varying situations of human need." SUPPLEMEN-
TARY BENEFITS COMMISSION, HANDBOOK 1 (1971), cited in T. H. MARSHALL, After-
thought in the Right to Welfare, in THE RIGHT TO WELFARE 95 (1981).
[Vol. 28: p. 923
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formalist character of Western society, points out that "[E]very con-
flict is solved according to the letter of the law and this is considered
to be the ultimate solution. If one is right from a legal point of view,
nothing more is required .... ,,22
Interactions between individuals may also fall prey to
overformalization. If each "squeaky wheel" must be lubricated by
way of a lawsuit, human intercourse will be turned into legal inter-
course. Such formalization of social interaction, while providing due
process protections for the few, can only destroy the rich fabric of
human relationships for the many. There is clearly much truth in
Philip Lewis' suggestion that parties may, on occasion, be better off
fixing a leaky roof themselves than suing their landlord to effectuate
the repair. 23 In economic parlance, "externalities" of seeking redress
may counsel against a punctilious vindication of every jot and tittle
due. The prudent course of action is, at times, inaction. As Judge
Learned Hand astutely observed, one should "dread a lawsuit beyond
22. A. Solzhenitsyn, A World Spht Apart, in SOLZHENITSYN AT HARVARD 3 (R.
Berman ed. 1980). Solzhenitsyn continues,
[A] society with no other scale but the legal one is . . . less than worthy of
man. A society based on the letter of the law and never reaching any
higher fails to take advantage of the full range of human possibilities. The
letter of the law is too cold and formal to have a beneficial influence on
society. Whenever the tissue of life is woven of legalistic relationships, this
creates an atmosphere of spiritual mediocrity that paralyzes man's noblest
impulses."
Id. at 7-8. See also Shenker, Solzhemtsyn, in Harvard Speech, Terms West Weak & Cow-
ardly, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1978, at A8, col. 1.
23. See Lewis, Unmet Legal Needs, in P. MORRIS, R. WHITE & P. LEWIS, SOCIAL
NEEDS AND LEGAL ACTION 73, 79 (1973). Lewis suggests that the definition of a
situation as a legal problem directs the disputants to a judicial solution, even where it
might be more sensible to "take practical steps to avoid material damage regardless
of ... legal responsibilities." Id.
See also Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute tProcessing, 9 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 63, 81 (1974) ("lumping it" means to withdraw from a dispute rather
than attempting to resolve it. Typically, individuals involved in a dispute with a
large organization tend to "lump it" due to the discrepency in size and power). See
also Felstiner, Avoidance as Dispute Processing: An Elaboration, 9 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 695
(1975).
Exit is another form of "lumping it." See A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND
LOYALTY 15-16 (1970) (exit is the economic response of a dissatisfied customer in
shifting from the unsatisfactory product to another).
The problem, of course, is that there is some empirical evidence that low-income
persons have a higher proclivity to "lump it." See D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY
MORE (1963). Caplovitz reported that, in his survey of consumer activity in low-
income New York neighborhoods, half of the families who stated that they had been
cheated had done nothing about it; 40% tried to deal with the merchant themselves;
and only 9% sought professional help. Id. at 171-74. See also Miller & Sarat, Grievances
Claims and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture 15 L. & Soc'Y REV. 525 (1980-81).
Miller and Sarat have found that one-fourth of those with consumer complaints of
$1000 or more do not make claims. Id. at 561.
1982-83]
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almost anything else short of sickness and death. '24
The logic of the judicialization of our culture is a social condition
of "total redress" 25 in which no injury is permitted to stand unad-
dressed by the government or the courts. While this condition may
be beneficial to individual desires, it may create intolerable strains on
the gossamer threads of communal solidarity. Courts cannot "fill the
void created by the decline of church, family and neighborhood
unit."' 26 For a social order to survive, citizens must possess some
"other-regarding" concerns. They must focus on their societal duties
as well as their societal rights. More specifically, they must be sensi-
tive to the effect of their claims of right on the social fabric. This
communally oriented internal brake on litigation has seemingly been
lost. Presently, the only brake on the public's craving to take every
disagreement to court is cost.
27
B. Has the Rtsing Number of Attorneys Spurred the Lit'igation Exploston?
There is a story about a small-town lawyer who was struggling to
make ends meet. One day a new lawyer hung out his shingle. A
friend remonstrated to him that there was not sufficient business for
one, let alone two attorneys. Some time later this friend returned to
town and found that both attorneys were thriving.2 8 The moral of
the story is that litigation begets litigation and that the number of
attorneys in a nation may have considerable effect on the amount of
litigation.
Although demand is not a direct correlative of supply, it is fair to
suggest that the growth of the profession contributes significantly to
the growth in the demand for attorneys. Specifically, increased sup-
24. L. Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in 3 LEC-
TURES ON LEGAL Topics 89, 105 (Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
1926).
25. J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 9, at 31 ("total redress stands for the proposition
that no moral society can permit any injury to stand unredressed").
26. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982). See also Kline,
Law Reform and the Courts.- More Power to the People, or to the Profession?, 53 CAL. ST. B.J.,
14, 18 (1978) (as traditional institutions such as family, church and school lose au-
thority, courts become centers of dispute resolution even though courts are ill-suited
to addressing many human problems); Tribe, Too Much Law, Too Little justice: An
Argument for Delegaliztig America, 244 ATL. 25, 26 (1979) ("the atomization of society
has triggered" the legal explosion).
27. Kurland, Government byJudciagy, 2 U. ARK. LITLE ROCK L.J. 307, 319
(1979) ('[w]here the costs [of litigation] are nominal or nonexistent, you may well
expect that very large numbers of persons are willing to make the investment. The
increased authority of the judiciary is a direct response to the requests of a new line of
consumers for the judicial product...").
28. I am indebted to Roger Cramton for first bringing this anecdote to my
attention.
[Vol. 28: p. 923
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ply affects lawyer use in at least two ways. First, it is affected by the
ease with which potential clients can find lawyers. 29 Where a large
number of lawyers exist in a community, it is more likely that layper-
sons will know attorneys personally and, thus, will have easier access
to legal counsel and resources should legal problems arise.
Second, the impact of an increase in the number of attorneys in a
given community will likely be visible in the general social culture.
In a city like Washington, D.C., where one out of every eighteen per-
sons is a lawyer,30 the extent to which law has permeated the cultural
atmosphere is painfully clear. One thinks of the by now famous New
Yorker cartoon depicting a Washington cocktail party where the so-
cial-climbing guest quizzically asks, "You mean you're not a lawyer?"
The profession has attempted to use its control of admission to
the bar, residency requirements, and perhaps disciplinary procedures
to control supply. Through the state legislatures, some state bar as-
sociations have sought control over the number and size of law
schools. 3 1 In addition, these associations have used unauthorized-
practice laws to control demand by preventing leakage to collateral
occupations, "cooling-out" real estate brokers, title insurers and ac-
countants32 from work which the profession dominates as exclusively
"law-jobs." These efforts, once classic examples of monopoly power,
have proven less successful in recent years as courts have accommo-
dated the critique of professionalism embodied in the consumer
movement. Still, the ferocity of the profession's concern for supply
and demand considerations suggests the importance attached to con-
trol of the market for legal services.
3 3
29. See generaly Mayhew, Insttutions of Representation: Civi'Justice and the Pubic, 9
L. & Soc'Y REV. 401, 404 (1975) ("[w]hether any given situation becomes defined as
a "legal" problem, or... makes its way to an attorney, is a consequence of the social
organization of the legal system and the organization of the larger society-including
• . . the available legal machinery and the channels for bringing perceived injustices
to legal agencies"). See also Mayhew & Reiss, The Social Organization of Legal Contacts,
34 AM. Soc. REV. 309 (1969).
30. See Winter, Legal Surplus Spurs Alove to Shut a School, 68 A.B.A. J. 898 (1982)
(citing U.S. census and ABA membership statistics).
31. Some California legislators have urged that one of the state's law schools be
closed due to the lawyer glut. See, e.g. , Winter, supra note 30. Similar positions have
been taken in Kentucky. Id. See also PRICHARD COMMITTEE ON HIGHER EDUC. IN
KENTUCKY'S FUTURE, IN PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE (1981).
32. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAWYERS AND CERTIFIED PUBLIC Ac-
COUNTS, LAWYERS AND CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS: A STUDY OF INTER-
PROFESSIONAL RELATIONS 69 (1981).
33. One example of the ABA's concern for demand creation can be seen at the
1982 ABA Convention where the House of Delegates voted to support two legislative
proposals which would subsidize lawyers' fees and encourage the bringing of lawsuits.
The proposals included making personal legal fees deductible and the broadening of
the Equal Access to Justice Act which requires court-awarded attorney fees for indi-
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While restricting supply conventionally serves to increase de-
mand for existing attorneys, supply control does not increase macro-
demand, i.e., the demand for new attorneys. As suggested, however,
an increase in supply may have this effect. In recent years there has
been a veritable explosion in supply. In 1977, there were more than
460,000 lawyers in the United States,34 and over 121,000 individuals
enrolled in ABA approved law schools. 35 Indeed, between 1969 and
1979, the number of lawyers admitted to practice equalled the
number of attorneys practicing in 1969.36
Observers such as Derek Bok have linked the increase in the size
of the profession with the increased cost and complexity of litiga-
tion.3 7 President Bok suggests that this complexity leads to a variety
of inefficiencies by virtue of which lawyers have become stumbling
blocks to the increase of the nation's productive capacity rather than
facilitators in the resolution of economic and social problems. It is
from this claim that President Bok derives perhaps his most contro-
versial thesis-that the increase in lawyers since World War II has
caused "a massive diversion of exceptional talent into pursuits that
often add little to the growth of the economy, the pursuit of culture,
or the enhancement of the human spirit."'38 In short, lawyers, like the
viduals and small businesses that successfully sue federal government agencies. See
Taylor, ABA Issue. Pub/c Good vs. Its Own, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1982, at 26, col. 4.
34. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPr. OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 419 (1978). See generally Pashigian, The Number and
Earnings of Lawyers: Some Recent Findings, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 51, 54.
There are presently more than 500,000 lawyers in the United States. The Bureau of
Census put the figure at 547,000 for 1980. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT.
OF COMMERCE; STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 402 (1981).
35. White, Law School Enrollment Up Slightly but Leveling, 65 A.B.A.J. 577 (1979).
36. See Schwartz, Reorgamzation of the Legal Profession, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1269,
1270 (1980).
37. See Harvard University, The President's Report 6-7 (1981-82) reprinted in Bok, A
Flawed System, HARV. MAG. May-June, 1983, at 38, 41 [hereinafter cited as President's
Report ].
38. Id. at 6. President Bok treats many of the issues considered in this essay,
albeit from a somewhat different perspective. Although the broad sweep of President
Bok's analysis clearly points in the right direction, a problem arises in his attempt to
pinpoint the cause of the current crisis. He suggests a variety of factors which really
collapse into three explanatory causes. First, he blames capitalism, writing,
At bottom, ours is a society built on individualism, competition, and suc-
cess. These values bring great personal freedom and mobilize powerful en-
ergies. At the same time, they arouse great temptations to shoulder aside
one's competitors, to cut corners, to ignore the interests of others in the
struggle to succeed. . . . As society demands higher standards of fairness
and decency, the rules of the game tend to multiply and the umpire's bur-
den grows constantly heavier.
President's Report, supra note 37, at 8-9.
This attitude betrays Holmes' view of the law as designed to curb excesses of the
"bad man" who without fear of legal sanctions will no doubt engage in greater and
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bourgeoisie in Marxist analysis, are seen as an encumberance on the
productive sector, if not a parasitic element whose middleman func-
tion in no way contributes to the economy.
This notion of the attorney as a problem-creator differs radically
from the historical view of the lawyer as a problem-solver who pro-
motes the productive function by navigating clients through legal and
political difficulties. Indeed, legal realists such as Roscoe Pound
viewed the attorney's ability to provide mechanisms for resolving so-
cial conflict as a socially valuable role to be encouraged.
3 9
Our concern, of course, is not Shakespeare's. We need not, like
him, urge "the first thing let's do we'll kill all the lawyers." '40 Indeed,
attempts to abolish the professional lawyer class after the American,
Soviet, and Chinese revolutions consistently failed as an attorney class
over time reclaimed its predominant role in the dispute resolution
process. 4 1 In order to restore lawyers to their traditional function as
greater prevarications. See Holmes, 7he Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 459
(1897). Even more disturbing, President Bok's view conflates individualism with a
propensity to illegality-an astonishing proposition.
Coupled with this penchant for collectivity is the view that collective solutions to
legal problems are far superior to individual solutions, if only because of efficiency
considerations. Thus, President Bok argues implacably for a redirection of our legal
system away from the resolution of individual disputes and towards the disposition of
social concerns and controversies. President's Report, supra note 37, at 11-12. While
less strident in this claim than many, he criticizes the tendency of adjudicatory mech-
anisms "to concentrate on the immediate case at hand while paying less heed to the
effects on a wider public." Id. at 9. He suggests efforts to reduce the complexity of
the law by simplifying procedures and creating, where possible, "bright line" sub-
stantive rules. Id. at 14-15. While such efforts are worthy, they are the job of legisla-
tures, not of the courts. Lawyers ought to be involved in these enterprises, but not in
the context of client representation. President Bok's failure to distinguish between
the attorney's function as agent of his client and the attorney's social function as
commentator on the legal system is a key error. One cannot easily fulfill both func-
tions at the same time.
39. See R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 23-28
(1953). Dean Pound, in expounding on the various roles of the lawyer, wrote that the
lawyer as advisor "has a function of prevention of or forstalling controversy, prevent-
ing needless resort to the courts, and keeping enterprises and undertakings to the
straight paths prescribed by law." Id. at 27-28. As to litigation, he wrote, "[A] skilled
advocate saves the time of the courts and so public time and expense." Id. at 26.
40. W. SHAKESPEARE, The Second Part of Ktg Henry the Sixth, Act IV, Scene II.
41. For a historical review of the role of lawyers in the U.S.S.R., see Hazard, The
Lawyer Under Soctahim, 1946 Wis. L. REv. 90. Immediately after the Russian Revolu-
tion, the organized bar was abolished. Id. at 92. By 1917, laymen were permitted to
serve as counsel for their peers, and by 1918, the bar was reestablished as a state
organization. Under this scheme, lawyers were salaried civil servants. Id. at 92-93.
The experiment failed, and from 1920 until 1922, only laypeople were permitted to
perform the function of attorneys. The position of the lawyer as a professional was
reestablished by legislation in 1922-23. This reestablishment coincided with enact-
ment of the New Economic Policy which was based on organization and control of
state owned enterprises, functions which required the talent of lawyers. Id. at 94-96.
Hazard observed that, although many individual lawyers were purged in the years
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problem-solvers, society must not extirpate lawyers but, rather, limit
their necessity. Are there ways to diminish the power of lawyers in
American society so as to unleash the social creativity of the country
unhampered by legalistic impediments? The answer to this challenge
lies in an exploration of the role of legalism in American culture.
C. Have Changes in Our Legal Culture Afected the Character and Extent
of Litigation?
One explanation of the increase in litigation is that it reflects
changes in our overall legal culture which, in turn, mirror changes in
our social culture. Predominant among the social and legal develop-
ments which have affected the incidence of litigation are the shift to-
ward no-fault legal systems, the emergence of a belief in an
individual's entitlement to fulfillment, the breakdown of traditional
social institutions, and the development of social attitudes which fos-
ter the use of litigation to promote a variety of unrelated goals.
In spirit, if not in fact, we have assumed a no-fault approach to
injury. Americans sue because they believe that the good life is owed
to them. Unfortunate happenstances are blamed not on fate, but on
the improper intervention of both man and state. This attitude is
supplemented by a rhetoric of rights and entitlements created by the
constitutional framework of our American democracy which fosters
recourse to law to satisfy social claims made on the state.
The rejection of the concept of fault has been styled a shift to-
following the revolution, the function of the legal profession survived. Id. at 91-92.
See also H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 13-65 (rev. ed. 1963); R. CONQUEST,
JUSTICE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE U.S.S.R. 13-21 (1969); S. KUCHENOV, THE
ORIGINS OF SOVIET ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 449 (1970).
For a discussion of the role of lawyers in the People's Republic of China, see
V.H. LI., LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF LAW IN CHINA AND
IN THE U.S. (1978). When the Communists siezed power in 1949, they retained
many lawyers, but emphasized political ideology rather than legal skills in training
new personnel to fill legal positions. Id. at 22-23. At criminal trials, persons were
expected to defend themselves or rely on friends or relatives. Id. at 71. Recently,
however, an increased need for lawyers and legalization has been recognized. See
Butterfield, Three Economic Experts Get Key Peking jobs, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1979, at 1,
col. 5. The new criminal code, drafted in 1979, provides a criminal defendant with
the right to a lawyer, and requires the court to appoint one at the defendant's re-
quest. Id. at A8. See also Cohen, Continuity and Change in China: Sdme "Law Day"
Thoughts, 24 S.C.L. REV. 3 (1972); Huang, Reflections on Law and the Economy in the
People's Republic of China, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 261 (1973); Butterfield, China is Codify-
ing LegalSystem and Plans to Insure Open Trials, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1979, at 1, col. 3.
The antipathy to lawyers in post-revolutionary America is traced in M. BLOOM-
FIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 32-58 (1976); 1 A. H.
CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 65 (1965); 2 A. H. CHROUST, THE
RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 3-99 (1965); C. WARREN, HISTORY OF THE AMERI-
CAN BAR 214-24 (1911); Gawalt, Sources of Anti-Lawyer Sentiment in Massachusetts, 14
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283 (1970).
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wards a fiduciary society in which contract and tort rules are infused
with a concern for the results of a defendant's actions and, perhaps
solto voce, a concern for whether anything could have been done to
prevent injurious results to others. 42 An ironic consequence of our
cultural shift is the replacement of moral responsibility with legal lia-
bility for any damages suffered.
Legal historians point out that no-fault principles are rooted in
medieval legal systems.43 If a farmer's ox gored a neighbor's cattle,
the courts did not inquire into the extent to which the ox's owner
maintained strong fences. If the ox caused damage, its owner paid
restitution. This early articulation of strict liability faded in the 17th
and 18th centuries as concepts of fault and the requirement of negli-
gence entered tort principles. By the 19th century, tort recovery de-
pended, in large part, not on the fact of injury, but on the fault of the
defendant. 4 4 Tort became as much a moral as a legal theory.
This century, however, has seen a continuous and, in large part,
successful assault on the citadel of fault. 45 The theory of product lia-
bility has developed strict liability principles, jettisoning fault for the-
ories which assess where the risk of loss can best fall.46 The growth in
medical malpractice cases based on principles like res ipsa loquiter and
failure to provide informed consent undercut fault principles. In-
deed, some countries have discarded fault principles completely for a
wide variety of injuries in favor of no-fault compensation schemes.
4 7
42. See J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 9. "The course the law has taken may be
denoted as a movement from contract tofiduciay .... In moving away from a 'pure'
contract regime, society constrains freedom of action by imposing a fiduciary duty on
those whose actions affect others". Id. at 20. In other words, while in the past society
favored binding persons to contracts they freely negotiated, now society requires one
to assume a fiduciary status when his actions affect others. Id. at 20-21.
Evidence of this societal shift may be found in the unconscionability provision of
the Uniform Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) provides as follows:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the con-
tract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the con-
tract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1979). In a "pure" contract-based society, even unconscionable
contracts would be enforced, so long as they were freely negotiated. A fiduciary
society, on the other hand, affords more protection and provides some escape hatches
from poor contracts.
43. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 12.3 at 749 (1956).
44. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 4 at 17-18 (4th ed. 1971).
45. Seegeneraloy, Prosser, Fallof the Citadel, 32 AM. TRIAL LAW. J. 1 (1968); Pros-
ser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965).
47. See Accident Compensation Act 1972, 1973 N.Z. REPR. STAT. §§ 4(b), 4 (c),
5(1). The Act provides for compensation for work-related injuries such as hernias
and industrial deafness as well as for diseases arising out of employment. Id. In
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The erosion of fault principles has been joined with a second fea-
ture of modern life to contribute to the litigation explosion. This
feature can only be described as a belief in an individual's entitlement
to fulfillment and happiness. The pursuit of happiness is a natural
human goal. Its articulation as a claim which a citizen can make on
the state, however, is a peculiarly American phenomenon. From its
enlightenment roots, 48 the American belief that citizens had a claim
to self-realization in their affairs has become transmitted into a phi-
losophy that one not only has a right to attempt to secure one's happi-
ness, but that one has a right to succeed in that quest. This focus on
results rather than opportunity has given rise to a barrage of litiga-
tion, the essence of which is the claim that one has failed to secure
one's due. Thus, children have sued parents for poor parenting4 9 and
parishioners have claimed damages from ministers for alleged negli-
gent ministering. 50 The government is sued continuously for failing
to provide or assure the rights which citizens of past generations
merely wished to be free to seek.
While the growth in litigation stems in part from changing atti-
tudes toward rights and responsibilities, it also reflects the increasing
precariousness of our social structure.The increase in litigation thus
suggests the diminished role of mediating institutions such as reli-
gious, family and ethnic associations in aiding to resolve social con-
flict and individual disputes. For, as Lieberman observes,
The litigious impulse lies deeper than greed. A lawsuit is a
addition, the Act provides for lost earnings, funeral expenses and aid to dependents.
Id. For discussion of the New Zealand System, see Harris, Accident Compensation in
New Zealand A Comprehensive Insurance System, 37 MOD. L. REV. 361 (1974); Palmer,
Accident Compensation in New Zealand- The First Two Years, 25 AM. J. CoMP. L. 1
(1977); Palmer, Compensation for Personal Inury: A Requiem for the Common Law in New
Zealand, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1973); Palmer & Lemons, Toward the Disappearance of
Tort Law--New Zealand's New Compensation Plan, 1972 U. ILL.. L.F. 693.
48. The development of this principle of the Enlightenment is discussed in H.
JONES, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS (1966).
49. See, e.g., Parental Malpractice? 64 A.B.A. J. 961 (1978) (a 25 year old male
sued his parents for neglect, seeking medical expenses and punitive damages).
50. See, e.g., Radecki v. Schuckhardt, 50 Ohio App. 2d 92, 361 N.E.2d 543
(1976) (husbands could not recover for alienation of their wives' affection which they
claimed resulted from defendants' convincing the wives to follow certain religious
tenets; recovery would only be allowed if defendants intended to bring destruction to
the marriages); Bradesku v. Antion, 21 Ohio App. 2d 67, 255 N.E.2d 265 (1969)
(husband, remarried after divorce, could not recover from church for alienation of his
second wife's affections when she left him after accepting the church's view that a
divorced man commits adultery when he remarries); Bear v. Reformed Mennonite
Church, 421 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 105 (1975) (plaintiff, who had been excommunicated
by his church, could recover against church for church's insistence that other mem-
bers of the church, including plaintiff's wife and children, must boycott plaintiff's
business or themselves face excommunication).
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signal that something has gone wrong. It may be a little
thing-like the refusal of a person to abide by a promise.
Or it may be a major failure; the impotence of political in-
stitutions, the disequilibrium of an economy, the decay of
social organizations, the collapse of corporate competence,
the decline of communal feeling.5 1
It is difficult to treat an effect spawned by such a welter of complex
causes.
Some commentators justify the increasing volume of litigation by
arguing that easy access to courts is a necessary mechanism by which
aggrieved citizens can secure redress for grievances. They see the liti-
gation explosion in products liability, medical malpractice, and envi-
ronmental protection as a "second-best" solution for deterring
improprieties. A free market of litigation, they urge, will cause par-
ties to be sensitive to the other-regarding consequences of their con-
duct. Corporate planners in particular, they hope, will invest more
funds in safety research to avoid the financial consequences of
litigation.
52
Litigation can be seen as a means for these dispossessed groups to
achieve a level of influence over governmental conduct. For many
interest groups, the costs associated with traditional legislative and
administrative lobbying effectively preclude them from utilizing these
means to influence public policy. 53 This use of litigation, however,
cuts against efforts to control the litigation explosion. Social change
51. J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 9, at 7. In tracing his position on the changes in
judicial attitudes, Lieberman describes five areas of the law where litigation has ex-
ploded: products liability; medical malpractice; environmental protection; public in-
stitutions; and suits against the government (government immunity). Id. at 33-161.
These areas are disparate and it is difficult to use them as the basis for a general
theory of litigiousness. Perhaps Lieberman's failure to do so reflects the elusiveness of
the quest.
52. See, e.g., id. at 64-65 (increase in product liability suits has caused corpora-
tions to invest in safety engineering as means of avoiding exhorbitant costs of
litigation).
53. For example, the Honorable David Bazelon has commented that "[i]f the so-
called 'litigation crisis' is due in any significant part to the increase in social expecta-
tions of the disadvantaged and to society's growing sensitivity to such issues, and I
believe it is, then in my opinion the increase in litigation is a healthy one." Legal
Times, Aug. 1, 1983, at 9, col. 1 (quoting excerpts from Judge Bazelon's commence-
ment speech at the University of Washington Law School).
Even if this counterintuitive position is correct, it still fails to belie the point that
the present growth in litigation may have deleterious consequences for our social
structure and our court system. See e.g., J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 9, at 186. Lieber-
man suggests that "[a] society that is law saturated inclines toward the belief that in
the absence of declared law anything goes. . . . [Litigation does] much to sow mis-
trust, and its limited successes may blind us to the need for reforms that lie outside
the ceaseless cycle of plaintiff and defendant." Id.
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litigation is often complex and time-consuming to both litigants and
the courts. This effort to define courtrooms as extensions of legisla-
tures twists our conventional understanding of the lawsuit. Our para-
digm of the legal process should not legitimate lawyers' use of delay,
publicity, or interest group pressure as tactical considerations in the
litigation process. While it is only realistic to recognize that litigation
is one tactic available to pressure groups, it should not necessarily be
viewed as the "window of opportunity" it now is.
II. CAN INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PREVENT
EXCESSIVE LITIGATION?
There has been increased interest in the use of informal dispute
resolution techniques as a way of avoiding the cost and delay associ-
ated with formal adjudication. Many states now require arbitration
prior to lawsuit. 54 Some companies have chosen arbitration or medi-
ation rather than incur the expense of going to court.5 5 Judges, in
54. Pennyslvania requires arbitration for most civil cases where damages
claimed do not exceed $20,000. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7361(a),
7361 (b) (Purdon 1981). See Rosenberg & Schubin, Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory Arbitra-
tion of Small Claims tn Pennsylvania, 74 HARV. L. REV. 448 (1961); Sherman, Analysis of
Pennsylvania's Arbitration Act of 1980, 43 U. Prr. L. REV. 363 (1982). In New York,
compulsory arbitration has been instituted in some counties. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit.
22, § 28 (1980). In each superior court with 10 or more judges, California requires
arbitration where the amount-in controversy is less than $15,000. In any superior
court with less than 10 judges, cases are submitted to arbitration at the judge's discre-
tion. In Los Angeles and San Bernardino counties, arbitration is compulsory where
the amount in controversy does not exceed $25. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1141.10-
.32 (West 1982). California's experience with compulsory arbitration is reviewed in
D. HENSLER, A LIPSON & E. ROLPH, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: THE
FIRST YEAR 24-103 (1981).
In certain categories of cases, the United States Department of Justice has exper-
imented with compulsory arbitration by panels comprised of three attorneys. In
Connecticut, Federal Court arbitration is mandatory when the claim arises under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, if the action is for breach of contract, personal injury, prop-
erty damage or police misconduct, or if the parties consent and damages do not ex-
ceed $100,000. D. CONN. R. 28. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania mandates
arbitration for the same types of cases as Connecticut, but utilizes a $50,000 damage
ceiling. E.D. PA. R. 8. The Northern District of California adds to the Connecticut
list actions arising under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Act (33 U.S.C.
§§ 901-950) and the Miller Act (40 U.S.C. § 270(b)). N.D. CAL. R. 500. A $100,000
damage limitation is imposed. Id.
In his analysis of procedural informalism in North America and Western Eu-
rope, Bryant Garth observed that "compulsory arbitration of claims involving rela-
tively large amounts of money is not new in the United States . . . but in the last few
years there has been a remarkable burst of enthusiasm for such reforms. The growing
concern about limited public resources . . . has also prompted compulsory arbitra-
tion programs." Garth, The Movement Toward Procedural Informahsm in North America and
Western Europe: A Critical Survey, in 2 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 183, 200
(R. Abel ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as 2 INFORMAL JUSTICE].
55. A 1975 estimate revealed that the average cost of simply reading and taking
notes on documents in civil litigation, using 10,000 ten page documents and the re-
[Vol. 28: p. 923
THE JUSTICE CONUNDRUM
particular, have hailed this step as a vehicle for unclogging court
caseloads. 56
The strategy of informal dispute resolution is extensively ana-
lyzed from a critical perspective in a two volume work edited by
Richard Abel, entitled The Poliics of Informal Justice .57 The case-stud-
ies in Abel's collection come from all parts of the globe. He provides
wide-ranging essays regarding conciliation mechanisms in India
58
and Japan. 59 Considerable space and rhetorical attention are paid to
forms of popular justice in revolutionary Chile,60 Portugal6' and
Mozambique. 6 2 Much attention is given in this study to the legal aid
and advice scheme existing in prefascist Germany6 3 as well as to the
suiting 5,000 pages of transcript, would be $300,000. Halverson, Coping with the Fruits
of Discovery in the Complex Case-The Systems Approach to Litigation Support, 44 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 39, 39-40 n.2 (1975). The high costs of litigation have resulted in a move-
ment by large corporations to budget litigation costs by monitoring the activities and
costs of outside counsel. See Reading the Riot Act to Outside Counsel, BUSINESS W., Feb.
22, 1982, at 39. Other corporations have simply increased the amount of litigation
handled by in-house counsel. See Lynch, The Growth of In-House Counsel, 65 A.B.A. J.
1403 (1979); Compames Expanding Legal Staffs as the Cost of Outside Work Soars, Wall St.
J., Mar. 1, 1982, at 25, col. 3. It has been estimated that in-house attorneys cost 35 to
50% less than outside attorneys. Id. But see Carlson, A Few Stand Ftrm Against In-House
Trend, Legal Times, May 17, 1982, at 1, col. 1 (at least 20 of the current Fortune 500
Corporations' have no in-house legal counsel; some have estimated the use of outside
counsel to be less expensive).
The litigation audit has been proposed as a means for corporations to anticipate
potential suits and reduce the costs of future case dispositions. See Gonser & Wil-
helm, A New Direction ih Preventive Law: The Litigation Audit, 68 A.B.A. J. 446 (1982).
In the audit, corporate counsel interview managers to discuss the litigation process,
and particularly, preservation of rights. Id. at 448. Data sources are then reviewed to
determine how best to handle corporate records. Id. A more robust form of preven-
tive audit has been described in Chayes, Greenwald & Wing, Managing Your Lawyers,
HARV. BUS. REV. Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 84. In this form of audit, outside counsel re-
views company procedures to minimize litigation risks and reduce total legal costs.
Id. at 87-88.
For a discussion of corporations' use of environmental mediation, see note 114,
in/a.
56. See Cooke, Highways and Byways of Dispute Resolution, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
611, 617-25 (1981).
57. THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (R. Abel ed. 1982).
58. Meschievitz & Galanter, In Search of Nyaya Panchayals: The Politi s of a Mori
bund Institution, in 2 INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 54, at 47-77.
59. Haley, The Politics of InformalJustice: The japanese Experience, 1922-1942, in 2
INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 54, at 125-47.
60. Spence, Institutionahiing Neighborhood Courts. Two Chilean Experiences, in 2 IN-
FORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 54, at 215-49.
61. De Sousa Santos, Law and Revolution in Portugal The Experiences of Popular
Justice after the 25th of April 1971, in 2 INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 54, at 251-80.
62. Isaacman & Isaacman, A Socialist Legal System in the Making: Mosambique before
and after Independence, in 2 INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 54, at 281-323.
63. Reifner, Individuahstic and Collective Legaliation: The Theoy and Practice of Legal




summary justice issued under the Argentine generals. 64 Surprisingly,
no case study of informal institutions in Europe is provided, although
Bryant Garth's excellent theoretical essay describes much of the ex-
isting literature.
65
American legal scholarship has been consistently ahistorical and
acomparative, and thus the plethora of comparative analysis has re-
freshing features. Its relevance to the American experience, however,
is unclear unless one accepts Abel's quasi-Marxist theoretical struc-
ture. He argues,
State informal justice under advanced capitalism is a
very difficult phenomenon to understand and evaluate be-
cause it is constructed out of contradictions. . . . It appears
to be simultaneously more and less coercive than formal
law, to represent both an expansion of the state apparatus
and a contraction. For the same reason it is peculiarly resis-
tant to criticism: When accused of being manipulative it
can show its noncoercive face; when charged with aban-
doning the disadvantaged it can point to ways in which in-
formal justice extends state paternalism. It is essential to
unravel these contradictions if we are to grasp the full signif-
icance of recent legal innovations.
66
It is difficult to accept Abel's argument that informalism "ex-
tend[s] the ambit of state control" 67 by seeking "to review behavior
that presently escapes state control."'68 This charge, limited presuma-
bly to state-organized informal dispute resolution procedures such as
small claims courts and neighborhood justice centers, reflects an ex-
cessively formalistic analysis of the justice system. It is meaningless to
suggest that "[s]tate informal control does not informalize state con-
trol but rather undermines extrastate modes of informal control"
69
unless one can point to specific examples of existing nonstate control
64. Ietswaart, The Discourse of Summary Justice and the Discourse of Popular Justice." An
Analysts of Legal Rhetoric in Argentina, in 2 INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 54, at 149-79.
65. Garth, The Movement toward Procedural Informahsm in North America and Western
Europe. A Critical Survey, in 2 INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 54, at 183-211.
66. Abel, The Contradictions of InformalJustice, in 1 INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note
3, at 307 Commentary on the Abel collection has recognized that it "moves the work
on dispute processing into the political arena," taking a "jaundiced view" of "the
values inherent in informal judicial arrangements." P. J. WILKINSON, BIBLIOGRA-
PHY IN SocIo-LEGAL STUDIES No. 1, Supp., preface (Centre for Socio-Legal Studies,
Oxford 1982).
67. Abel, The Contradictions of InformalJustice, in 1 Informal Justice, supra note 3,
at 270.
68. Id. at 272.
69. Id. at 277.
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mechanisms that once thrived but were debilitated by the extension
of state-sanctioned informalism. Abel points to "gossip, boycott, self
help [and] refusal of reciprocity '70 as examples of extrastate informal-
ity threatened by the creation of state-organized informal justice.
Only a formalist analysis which focuses solely on the zero-sum nature
of state-pluralist relationships would agree that small claims courts
threaten the existence of private enterprises such as the Better Busi-
ness Bureau, 7 AUTOCAP,72 the Automotive Consumer Action Pro-
gram sponsored by the National Association of Auto Dealers, and
religious courts. 73 Furthermore, a thorough survey of dispute resolu-
tion alternatives should be conducted before accepting the argument
that these extrastate institutions are either thriving or sufficient to
serve the average person's need for dispute resolution fora.
More critically, most nonstate dispute resolution fora rely ulti-
mately on state-sanctioned authority to uphold their judgments. Cer-
tainly this holds true for private religious courts, which are often put
forward as models of consensual dispute resolution for the good soci-
ety to emulate. Although parties sign consent forms agreeing to be
bound by the religious tribunal's decision, victorious parties often
turn to the secular courts to enforce religious court judgments.
7 4
Even utopian communities ultimately rely on state authority to back
up informal group sanction. 75 However strong the group sanction, it
would be foolish to assume that the possibility of recourse to state
70. Id.
71. For a discussion of the Better Business Bureau, see Steele, Fraud, Disputes and
the Consumer.: Reiponding to Consumer Complaints, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1107, 1119 (1975)
(Bureau, created as a formal law enforcement institution, has evolved into an infor-
mal dispute managing institution). See also Eaton, The Better Business Bureau: "The
Voice of the People in the Marketplace," in No ACCESS TO LAw 233 (L. Nader ed. 1980).
72. For a discussion of the AUTOCAP program, see Greenberg & Stanton, Busi-
ness Groups, Consumer Problems." The Contradiction of Trade Association Complaint Handling,
in No ACCESS TO LAW 193, 198-201 (L. Nader ed. 1980) (see particularly, 198-201,
207-208, & 210-211). Most dealers use AUTOCAP to settle sales and service dis-
putes, while importers and American Motors use the arbitration system for product-
related disputes. Ford, and Chrysler have set up their own arbitration programs. See
Detroit's Torncfor Lemon Buyers, Bus. WK. April 4, 1983, at 54-55. See also In re Gen-
eral Motors Corp., No. 9145, slip op. at 15-16 (F.T.C. Nov. 16, 1983) (consent decree
outlining General Motors' plan to set up an arbitration system in conjunction with
the Better Business Bureau).
73. For a discussion of religious courts, see Kirsh, Conflict Resolution and the Legal
Culture: A Study of the Rabbinical Court, 9 0SGOODE HAi.i. L.J. 335 (1971); Note,
Rabbinical Courts, Modem Day Solomons, 6 COi.uM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 49 (1970). See
also J. YAFFE, SO SUE ME! (1972).
74. See,e.g., Kozlowsky v. Seville Syndicate, Inc., 64 Misc. 2d 109, 314 N.Y.S.2d
439 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) (review of rabbi's resolution of dispute among owners of
corporation).
75. The legal problems of dispute resolution in 19th century American utopias
are described in C. WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA 115-22 (1980). Analo-
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authority does not add an extra wallop. 76 Thus, Abel's sharp distinc-
tion between private and public informal dispute mechanisms ap-
pears overdrawn.
One radical critique of the informalist movement is the sugges-
tion that its concern for conciliation (on the civil side) and social inte-
gration (on the criminal side) leads to a further extension of state
power into the lifestyles and social habits of disputants. Abel argues
that this concern tends to shift the focus of the state from what per-
sons do, to what they are. This counterintuitive position is based on
the view that any activity rooted in state bureaucracy is necessarily
dangerous to the personal well-being of citizens. Thus, social welfare
efforts designed to resolve neighborhood disputes without recourse to
formal legal processes are attacked as a mechanism by which the state
gains control over informal neighborhood problems. 77 As minor crim-
inal complaints are diverted into informal courts, the state is said to
make judgments about a defendant's sobriety or work habits. Thus,
informality in the criminal context places the state in the rehabilita-
tion or behavior modification business. To this extent, informality in
criminal justice raises problems similar to those found in probation
and parole procedures that require the state to judge defendants' per-
sonal lifestyles, not their criminal conduct.
In addition to asserting that informalism is primarily a way to
extend state control, Abel argues that informal institutions serve to
"divert attention from structural conflict" in society. 78  First, he
charges that informalist solutions individualize grievances,7 9 inhib-
iting the aggregation of complaints which will give, so it is intimated,
increased structural power to the claims of the individual. Further,
he asserts that informal institutions divert "citizen attention from
problems that are relatively insoluble, and therefore, dangerous-be-
cause they pit the individual against the state or capital-to problems
that are relatively soluble and certainly less dangerous."8 0
gous contemporary problems in Israeli kibbutzim are analyzed in Weisman, The Kib-
butz: Israel's Collective Settlement, 1 ISRAEL L. REV. 99, 123-24 (1966).
76. Danzig & Lowy, Everyday Disputes and Mediation in the United States: A Reply to
Professor Felstlier, 9 L. & Soc'y REV. 63, 86-87 (1975). Danzig and Lowy claim that
non-coercive private "community moots" will work because "a complainant has
nothing to lose by turning first to it." Id. It is hard, however, to accept this view
because it ignores the problem of opportunity costs.
77. See Abel, The Contraditons of lnformal justce, in I INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra
note 3, at 267, 270-79.
78. Id. at 290.
79. Id. at 289.
80. Id. at 287. Professor Abel further suggests that informal dispute resolution
institutions "neutralize conflict," id. at 280, 292; "frustrate intangible goods," id. at
293; "confirm and strengthen the status quo;" id. at 300; and "are an attempt to
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These views are predicated on the belief that only through col-
lective action can one create a just political and social order. To that
end, activity which prevents the development of such a collectivist
perspective must be vigorously opposed, no matter how well it suc-
ceeds in dealing with the problems of individuals.
There is, of course, little truth embodied in this caricature of the
concern for the human face of justice-a concern which radicals like
Gabel81 complain has been lost in the "reified" 82 relations of liberal
capitalism. Would Abel rather that no group in society show concern
for neighborhood disputes over noise at night or garbage strewn on
lawns? Is an effort to channel fighting neighbors into a constructive
settlement rather than a court fight an enterprise to be condemned?
It is difficult to dismiss, as state imperialism, efforts by liberal capital-
ism to prevent human frustration and criminal "labelling" for minor
infractions.
A more serious threat to human liberty comes from the extremes
of the left and right, not from liberal capitalism. Thus, Heleen let-
swaart, in her study of Argentine popular justice, included in the
Abel collection, argues that criminal activity, which in a proto-fascist
state takes the form of subversion, is "essentially a life-style, a perma-
nent mental state, determined by certain objectives, convictions and
values." 83 Right-wing summary justice, the author points out, bears
close similarities to "popular justice" in left-wing countries.8 4 Both
revive faith in the beneficence of the state." Id. at 305. Some of the difficulties which
arise from Abel's approach are highlighted by his contention that informality also
constitutes a diversion of state resources from solutions to these problems. Id. at 287.
Given Abel's analysis, the state would never choose to do otherwise. The state is the
handmaiden of capital and, therefore, opposed to the needs of the "oppressed."
81. Gabel, Reiftation in Legal Reasoning, in 3 RESEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY
25 (R. Simon & S. Spitzer ed. 1980). See also Spitzer, The Dialectics of Formal and
Informal Control, in 1 INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 167.
82. For a discussion of reification, see Hofrichter, NeighborhoodJustice and the So-
cial Control Problems of American Capitalism: A Perspective, in 1 INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra
note 3, at 207, 243. See also G. LUKAS, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 83-110
(1971).
The problem with much of this Marxist analysis is its seeming necessity for
global interpretations. Such formalism requires all developments in court organiza-
tion to be related (ultimately) to some aspect of the class struggle. Thus, Hofrichter
attempts to explain the "reemergence of 'informal,' decentralized alternatives to
courts" as being "related to contradictions within and threats to continued capitalist
expansion, particularly the difficulties of coordinating labor power and containing
the political threat posed by labor and surplus populations (the underemployed, un-
employed and unemployable)." Hofrichter, supra, at 208-09.
83. Ietswaart, The Discourse of Summaqy ustice and the Discourse of PopularJustice: An
Analysis of Legal Rhetoric in Argentina, in 2 INFORMAl. JUSTICE, supra note 54, at 149,
170.
84. Id. at 153-54.
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are attempts "to democratize the administration of justice, in the
sense of increasing participation or involvement by more sectors of
the population. ' 85 Because the well behaved, participatory citizen is
the only citizen whose existence is recognized, the critical citizen is
left voiceless, and, effectively exiled.
86
The Marxist critique scores one point, however, by suggesting
that there is little evidence of public demand for mediation and arbi-
tration schemes.87 These critics argue that such programs, unless fu-
eled by court referrals "must engage in extensive public relations
activities to attract a sizable caseload."'8 8 It is in this putative lack of
public demand that Marxists see a conspiracy to extend state power
through the official fostering of informal dispute resolution schemes.
The more likely reason for the paucity of demand, however, is
the lack of public recognition of avenues for opening up the justice
process. It is this lack of awareness that is responsible for the small
public outcry about court delay and backlog. Given the expense and
complexity of the existing civil justice system, the ordinary citizen is
likely to give up and learn to "lump it" rather than pursue the possi-
bility of securing justice through an alternative dispute resolution sys-
tem. As a result of this attitude, the process of developing alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms in a legalistic society is a task for the
long haul.
The Abel critique of informality as a bourgeois reformist notion
is part of the critical legal scholars' attack on the legal institutions of
liberal capitalism. 89 The critical approach is designed to underscore
the "formalism" of the rule of law in modern society. Such formal-
ism, it is argued, leads to myths about the neutrality of law, and de-
nies the substantial effects of legal processes on the distribution of
wealth and power in society.90 Ironically, the Abel critique of infor-
mality is in large measure a "formalist" analysis open to similar at-
85. Id. at 154.
86. Id. at 171.
87. Hofrichter, NeighborhoodJustice and the Social Control Problems of American Capi-
tahm: A Perspective, in 1 INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 236-37.
88. Id. at 237.
89. Most of the essays in the Abel collection were written by members of the
Conference on Critical Legal Studies, although the "volumes are not an official pub-
lication of the Conference." See Abel, Introduction, in 1 INFORMALJUSTICE, supra note
3, at 2 n.!. The Conference on Critical Legal Studies is "an organization of several
hundred law teachers, social scientists, students and legal workers committed to ex-
ploring the relationship between legal theory and practice and the struggle for crea-
tion of a more humane and just society." Id. See also note 13 supra.
For a similar evaluation of both traditional formal rules of law and the informal-
ist approach, see J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW (1983).
90. See generally Spitzer, The Dialectics of Formal and Informal Control, in 1 INFOR-
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tack. The critique ignores the social reality of the pluralist character
of American legal institutions. It rejects the empirical reality that in-
dividuals who have grievances would prefer to have their specific
problems resolved before the structural problems of the community
are addressed. Moreover, the resolution of the problems of individu-
als need not interfere with efforts to produce structural changes in
society. To set priorities between such concerns is itself a formalist
enterprise.
The most penetrating effort to capture the tensions inherent in
the informalist vision is found in Bryant Garth's contribution to the
Abel volume. 9 1 Garth's analysis of the movement toward procedural
informalism, while sympathetic towards welfare state entitlements,
lacks the ideological fervor of the Abel collection's Marxist contribu-
tions. Garth focuses on three aspects of informalism: the belief that it
will help make rights more effective; the use of informal modes as
agencies of conciliation; and the need for informal modes as a diver-
sion mechanism from the formal legal system.9 2 Garth recognizes the
conceptual tensions between these goals, noting that "the ideology of
conciliation . . .appears hostile to the goal of making rights effec-
tive."'93 Diversion as well, he suggests, exhibits "the darker implica-
tions of conciliation. '94 Thus, Garth charges that the "primary goal
of diversion clearly is not the enforcement of rights, ' 95 but is rather a
concerted effort to funnel the poor and dispossessed into a second
class system of justice.
9 6
MAI. JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 175. Informalism is seen as alien to "repressive toler-
ance." H. MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN 119-20 (1964).
91. Garth, The Movement toward Procedural Informalism in North Amerzia and Western
Europe: A Critical Survey, in 2 INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 55, at 183.
92. Id. at 183-85.
93. Id. at 196.
94. Id. at 198. Garth contends that diversion may push out of the formal system
too many of the wrong kinds of cases. Id. For example, Garth points out that in
welfare rights cases the politically weak plaintiffs have depended more on the courts
than on the legislators for protection. Id. Moreover, diversion not only prevents
these cases from getting into court but, like conciliation, may also provide an inade-
quate substitute. Id. As Garth notes in discussing conciliation,
The question, then, must be the accuracy of the conciliator's view of
the law and who is likely to benefit from inaccuracy. Since only the organi-
zational litigant will probably know its rights-from experience in previous
controversies, information disseminated through trade associations, or the
advice of company counsel-and it is doubtful that the community
paraprofessional conciliators can acquire sufficient legal (or technical)
knowledge about welfare state rights, one can predict a definite bias against
the supposed beneficiaries of welfare state laws.
Id.
95. Id. at 200.
96. ld. at 200-01. But see Cappelletti and Garth, Access tojustice as a Focus of
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Whatever the etiology of the informalist impetus, it is perfectly
clear that the informal mechanisms advance certain very legitimate
interests. It is true that the bulk of the diversion tribunals created
under the informalist rubric are consumer or poverty oriented, in-
cluding consumer complaint boards, small claims courts and neigh-
borhood justice centers. 97 In the last five years, however, large
corporations and the government have increased their use of informal
mechanisms in an effort to reduce the length of complex commercial
litigation.98 While the structure of these informal efforts may differ
from small claims courts, they share a common focal point: the dero-
gation of formal adversary procedures in an effort to secure functional
efficiency and substantive justice.
Still, Garth's analysis poses in bas-relief the central question for
modalities of informality. Do we want to provide satisfaction or vin-
dication to aggrieved claimants? Clearly, as a society we do not want
to preclude persons from vindicating their rights under law. The pro-
verbial six-pence verdict in British libel cases underscores the notion
that persons may wish to pursue their legal rights at significant per-
sonal cost. Such decisions to litigate remain a personal choice conso-
nant with judicial restrictions of frivolous lawsuits. At the same time,
we need not encourage, nor subsidize, socially counterproductive be-
havior. Diversion and conciliation techniques provide opportunities
to resolve the social problems of those who focus on their grievances
rather than their abstract claims. However costly to lawyers, such a
focus cannot but yield a more harmonious social and legal order.
The Abel collection's critical legal thinkers were too busy
"demystifying" proposals for informal dispute resolution as methods
of enlarging the state's power over citizens to focus on their theoreti-
cal trump card-the tension between informalism and the already (to
them) suspect "rule of law." Since informal dispute resolution mech-
anisms do not require consistency between cases, restrict the admis-
sion of evidence, or provide protection against judicial bias in the
decision making process, the possibility exists that informalism could
breed ad hoc justice based on arbitrary determinations rather than
rules of general applicability. Hardly anywhere in the Abel collection
is this problem recognized, let alone explored-perhaps because argu-
Research, 1 WINDSOR Y.B. OF ACCESS TO JUST. ix (1981) (observing that the proce-
dural dimension of a right to access can be modified to include less expensive, less
formal procedures, rather than access only to lawyers and formal courts.)
97. See, e.g., Wahrhaftig, An Overview of Community-Oriented Ctizen Dispute Resolu-
titon Programs in the United States, in 1 INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 75.
98. For a discussion of informal dispute resolution mechanisms used by corpora-
tions, see notes 113-19 and accompanying text i'fra.
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ing this point would require the critical theorists to recognize value in
the rule of law with its attendant concern for neutrality, due process,
and systemic fairness.
It is possible, however, to reconcile concern for the rule of law
with the movement towards informalism by focusing on the various
roles which formality plays in ensuring fairness in different dispute
resolution contexts. For example, a rationally organized judicial sys-
tem would require punctilious formality when loss of liberty is at
stake but less stringent procedural protections to resolve traffic tickets.
The difference in attitude between the traditional proponents of
"the rule of law" and informalists may reflect values which flow from
two competing paradigmatic functions of law. 99 One paradigm fo-
cuses on the role of law as providing "a generalized normative order-
ing" for society. 1° ° A second approach focuses on the role of law as
providing a mechanism for the resolution of particular cases.' 0l This
distinction affects the approach to the work that courts do. When the
purpose of law is seen as generating abstract norms and values, one is
concerned with using courts for symbolic purposes. In this context
one may be prepared to divert ordinary day-to-day dispute processing
to non-judicial fora. Often, this rejection of adjudication suggests in-
formal and nonadversarial approaches to dispute resolution. The al-
ternative perspective would demand an expansion of the area of
disputes which are adjudicated and an expansion of the formal attrib-
utes of such adjudications.
III. ARE THERE ANY INTERMEDIATE STEPS THAT CAN BE
TAKEN ABSENT RADICAL REVISION OF THE PRESENT
SYSTEM?
While theoretical discussion of the social goals furthered by our
traditional legal system is important, and serious consideration must
be given to proposals for a long-term major overhaul of the existing
system, modest reforms are currently available to provide short-term
relief to alleviate the litigation explosion. Many of these reforms re-
volve around an effort to divert appropriate cases to informal fora.
At the same time, we must seek ways of streamlining the formal judi-
cial system without undermining the administration of justice. Fi-
99. See Engel & Steele, Civil Cases and Socity: Process and Order in the Civl dJustice
System, 1979 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 295. Engle and Steele describe these
two approaches as organic and mechanistic paradigms. Id. at 334-40.
100. Id. at 334. For a general discussion of the organic paradigm of law, see 1d.
at 338-39.
101. Id. at 337-38.
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nally, we need to critically reevaluate the role of lawyers in American
society.
One feature of informality ignored in the Abel collection is the
problem of deformalizing the formal litigation device-the lawsuit.
The state of the formal litigation market is the base from which the
success of all informal dispute resolution techniques must be judged.
To a great extent, informality yields expeditiousness. Various ef-
ficiency devices have been trumpeted to cure the delay inherent in
much formal litigation, including increased use of pre-trial confer-
ences,'0 2 discovery management, 10 3 and the use of telephone confer-
ence calls to replace courthouse proceedings. 0 4  All these changes,
102. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16. Rule 16 was amended in August, 1983 to
facilitate case management by fostering the scheduling of conferences, preferably
with active involvement of the judiciary. See generally S. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGE-
MENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 17
(Federal Judicial Center 1977) (to the extent the court can assume early control over
the pace of litigation, delay can be mitigated).
103. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26. Rule 26 was amended in August, 1983 to
improve judges' control over discovery abuses by allowing them to become more in-
volved in the discovery process and, when necessary, by allowing them to actually
manage the discovery process. For example, judges could reduce the amount of dis-
covery concerning certain matters by restricting the number of permissible deposi-
tions and interrogatories, or by restricting the scope of a production request. Id. See
also Brazil, Civil Discovery." Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Prtncial Problems and
Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 787; Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil
Dtcovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1979). But see J.
LEVINE, DISCOVERY 115-22 (1982) (providing a comparative analysis of the Ameri-
can and English discovery practice, and rejecting the view that discovery rules have
been frequently used to the disadvantage of justice). Levine concludes that
in summary, this examination of the incessant allegations of abuse of Amer-
ican federal discovery has established two positions. First, there has not
been pervasive, general abuse of discovery in the quantitative sense of over-
use. Second, there are adequate powers in general under F.R.C.P. to check
any attempted abuse in (a) the quantity or quality of discovery used or
(b) resistance to discovery.
Id. at 121. Moreover, Levine proposes reforms to expand discovery. Id. at 113.
The United States Supreme Court, like Levine, does not seem inclined to restrict
discovery. In Herbert v. Lando, the Court rejected the defendant publisher's assertion
that he had a privilege against discovery of his editorial process. The Court stated
that "the deposition discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment
to effect their purpose of adequately informing the litigants in civil trials ...
[There] are ample powers [in] the district judge to prevent abuse. . .. . Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979). See also Grady, Finding Our Way Through the Discovery
Jungle, 21 JUDGES J. 4 (1982). Judge Grady, a United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Illinois, suggests that obstruction and delay in the discovery pro-
cess are problems, but they are very small ones in the total scheme of things. Id. at 6.
Judge Grady believes that excessive discovery is the problem: "The real discovery
'abuse' is not resistance or delay, but unnecessar , discovery." Id.
104. See 1980 Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P., 77 F.R.D. 613, 628 (1978). Rule
37(b)(7) under the 1980 amendments authorizes the taking of telephone depositions
by order of the court. Id. at 626. For a discussion of telephone depositions See Dom-
broff, For Depositions, Let Your Fingers Do the Walking, Legal Times, Aug. 17, 1981, at
12, col. 1.
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however, are essentially cosmetic.
Serious changes in the existing system will come only if judges
are prepared to take the necessary action to make delay costly and
expedition rewarding. This means that judges must take their sanc-
tion power under the discovery rules seriously 0 5 and use screening
devices such as Rule Eleven 10 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and fee-shifting provisions 10 7 to prevent and penalize frivolous
105. See generally C. Ellington, A STUDY OF SANCTIONS FOR DISCOVERY ABUSE
(1979); Note, Sanctins Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 619 (1977); Note, The Emerging Deterrence Ortentation in the Impositon of
Discoveiy Sanctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1978). See also FED. R. CIv. P. 26(g). The
1983 amendment to this rule require attorneys to certify that discovery requests, re-
sponses and objections are
(1) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law; (2) not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unneces-
sary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreason-
able or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the
discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the im-
portance of the issues at stake in the litigation.
Id. This amendment underscores the judicial sanctioning authority by providing
sanctions for failure to certify as required, or for certification made in violation of the
rule. Id.
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 provides in pertinent part as follows:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an at-
torney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual
name, whose address shall be stated. . . . The signature of an attorney or
party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion,
or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper pur-
pose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation. . . . If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative,
shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party
or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attor-
ney's -fee.
See also Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement.- Some "Striking" Problems with
FederalRule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1970). Risinger notes the scarce
invocation of Rule Eleven, "Since the Rule was promulgated in 1938, there have
been only 23 reported cases where one party attempted to have all or part of the
opposing party's pleading stricken." Id. at 34. Cf MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2) (1979) ("In his representation of a client, a lawyer
shall not . . . .(k)nowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted .... ").
107. See Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980). In Roadway Express,
the Court recognized the inherent power of a federal court to award attorney's fees
for bad faith actions. Some states have enshrined this right in statute. See, e.g., CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 1982). Section 128.5 provides, in part, as follows:
Every trial court shall have the power to order a party or the party's
attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,
incurred by another party as a result of tactics or actions not based on good
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and unnecessary litigation.
Such efforts are admittedly more difficult for the judge than
shunting litigation off to specialized tribunals and pressing for infor-
mal diversion. Change may disrupt the cozy ecoculture of the court-
room where the lifestyle requirements of the judge are often placed
ahead of the needs of the litigants and other participants in the sys-
tem. Furthermore, efficient use of court time will require as much
self-discipline by the judiciary as it will demand social control of at-
torneys and court personnel. Given these factors, changes in this area
are easy to suggest and yet hard to effectuate.
The judicial branch must also reevaluate our basic model of an
"imperial judiciary."' 0 8 Courts must return to their primary purpose
of adjudicating disputes, leaving articulation of the community's
moral conscience to its proper repository-the legislature. While it is
unlikely that "institutional reform litigation" encompasses a large
proportion of the judicial docket, it symbolizes an infectious state of
mind. Such hubris leads courts consistently to expand their authority
beyond their institutional competence. 0 9 The result of such mis-
chievious forays bedevil the judiciary for years afterward.
faith which are frivolous or which cause unnecessary delay. Frivolous ac-
tions or delaying tactics include, but are not limited to, making or opposing
motions without good faith.
Id. See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 41 (Smith-Hurd 1968). Section 41 provides as
follows:
Allegations and denials, made without reasonable cause and not in good
faith, and found to be untrue, shall subject the party pleading them to the
payment of reasonable expenses, actually incurred by the other party by
reason of the untrue pleading, together with a reasonable attorney's fee, to
be summarily taxed by the court at the trial.
Id.
108. See D. HOROWITz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL Poiicy 4-6 (1977); Glazer,
Towards an ImperialJudiciay?, 41 Pub. Interest 104 (1975); Kurland, Government byJudici
agy, 2 U. ARK. LrrLE ROCK L.J. 307 (1979).
109. For a discussion of the unsuitability of courts to supervise the implementa-
tion of institutional change required by a judicial decree, see Berger, Away from the
Courthouse and into the Field" The Odyssey of a Special AIaster, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707
(1978). Berger observes as follows:
While the ordinary trial is a splendid vehicle for enabling a judge to assign
rights and duties, it is neither democratic, in the sense that all viewpoints
will be fully aired, nor very sensitive to the nuances of attitude that shade
public opinion. To impose systematic change without itself becoming a
legislative forum, the court should have access to whatever facts and opin-
ions may help it to mold the remedial decree.
Id. at 738. The author concluded that a special master can effectively fulfill the fact-
gathering function for the court. Id. But see Note, Implementation Problems tn Institu-
tional Reform Lit'gation, 91 HARV. L. REV. 428, 440-45 (1977) (although courts moni-
tor compliance with decrees through retention of jurisdiction and through the
appointment of formal monitors and masters, these efforts usually fail to provide the
court with adequate information for enforcement).
For a discussion of the use of special masters and other court-appointed agents,
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Some commentators have urged reform of the formal judicial
system through the creation of statutory courts to deal with such repe-
titious entitlement appeals as social security disability and environ-
mental cases. In their view, administrative courts could also be
developed to handle appeals in specialized areas such as labor and
antitrust laws.1 10 While questions have been raised regarding the
constitutional character- of specialized courts in the bankruptcy con-
text," ' the ultimate value of such courts, especially where factual is-
sues predominate, is clear. Even so, we must remember that such
courts will not solve the problem of the litigation explosion. They
will merely shift the caseload to less visible (or less powerful) forums.
Nonetheless, while specialized courts may not choke off the flow of
litigation, they may allow the litigation explosion to be handled more
efficiently without serious costs in fairness or loss of systemic
integrity. 112
In addition to improving efficiency in the formal dispute resolu-
tion process, extensive efforts should be made to divert complex and
significant cases into informal dispute resolution arenas. As should be
see Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litzgation, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 784, 826-37 (1978).
For a favorable view of active judicial control over institutional change, see Note
The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE
LJ. 1338, 1378-79 (1975).
110. See Griswold, Helping the Supreme Court by Reducing the Flow of Cases, 67 JUDI-
CATURE 58 (1983). The author points out that we already have a number of special-
ized courts. Id. at 65. For example, the United States Court of Military Appeals has
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the several tribunals of military justice, and
there is no right of review by the Supreme Court except where review is sought by
habeas corpus, which rarely happens. Id. The Temporary Emergency Court of Ap-
peals also has exclusive jurisdiction to review the decisions of any district court in the
United States in the field of energy law. Id. at 65-66. The author suggests that a
similar court should be established to decide conflicts among the United States
Courts of Appeals. Id. at 65. The author further suggests that we should have more
national courts of appeals with topical jurisdiction, such as the United States Court
of Tax Appeals, and that we could also have courts of appeals with exclusive jurisdic-
tion over labor cases, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Com-
mission and antitrust. Id. at 66. See also Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of
Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV.
542, 587-96 (1969) (urging the division of large circuits into permanent specialized
panels based on the subject matter of cases).
11. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982).
112. In a similar vein, the 1977 Pound Conference on judicial overload was re-
plete with suggestions to shift some of the federal caseload to state courts by abolish-
ing jurisdiction in diversity cases. See THE POUND CONFERENCE (A.L. Levin & R.
Wheeler eds. 1979). The conference commemorated the 71st anniversary of Roscoe
Pound's address to the American Bar Association at its 1906 Annual Meeting in St.
Paul Minnesota on "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice." The original Pound address is reprinted at 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964).
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obvious, mediation and arbitration are not dispute resolution ap-
proaches for the poor alone. The growth in use of private judges to
resolve corporate disputes in California;' 1 3 the increased use of media-
tion to resolve environmental conflicts;"14 and the use of mini-tri-
als,'1 5 summary jury procedures, 16 and other mechanisms in
complex commercial litigation exemplify the extension of summary
procedures into contexts other than one involving the poor.
In that regard, we may draw wisdom from TRW, a major air-
craft manufacturer that has made considerable use of diversion tech-
niques. TRW participated in the first mini-trial in 1977. The action
was a patent infringement suit in which it was a defendant. 1 7 After
three years of pre-trial work and the exchange of over 100,000 docu-
113. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 638-645 (West 1976). Under the California
scheme, litigation before the court can be referred to retired judges for trial on the
consent of the parties. See Christensen, Private Justice." California's General Reference Pro-
cedure, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 79; see also Hill, Rent-a-Judge, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 6, 1980, at 1, col. 1. If the parties agree, they can hire a retired judge for $500 or
more per day for a "quick, quiet trial;" often the parties can get a decision in a
matter of months rather than years. In addition, all that needs to be made public is
the petition to seek a private trial and the judgment. Id. Hill notes that "private
judging is catching [for those who can afford it] because attorneys don't feel that the
public courts have the time or competence to dispense good quality justice." Id.
Under this system, the parties can select a judge who has a distinguished record in
the area of law in question, thus insuring that the judge can deal competently with
the issues involved. Id.
114. Environmental mediation between corporations and local community
groups, federal agencies and public interest organizations is a rapidly expanding legal
field. See A. TALBOTTr, SETTLING THINGS: SIX CASE STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL
MEDIATION 7-24 (1983) (discussing the resolution of issues connected with the con-
struction of a nuclear power facility at Storm King Mountain, New York, and the
resolution of controversy connected with the approval of a hydroelectric power facil-
ity in Swan Lake, Maine). For a further discussion of the use of mediation tech-
niques in the environmental context, see note 119 and accompanying text infra.
115. The mini-trial is gaining popularity as a cost-cutting alternative to large
scale litigation. It fosters expeditious settlement through informal, nonbinding hear-
ings. For a discussion of the use of a mini-trial in a multi-million dollar patent in-
fringement suit, see Green, Marks & Olson, Settling Large Case Litigation. An Alternate
Approach, 11 Lo,'. L.A.L. REV. 493, 501 (1978) (mini-trial procedure was organized
over a period of several months; presentation lasted 2 days, after which settlement
was reached within 1/2 hour); Nilsson, A Litigation Settling Experiment, 65 A.B.A. J.
1818 (1979) (use of mini-trial saved $500,000 to $1,000,000 by avoiding trial); Solo-
mon, A Businesslike Way to Resolve Legal Disputes, FORTUNE, Feb. 26, 1979, at 80. See
also Johnson, Masri & Oliver, Mini- Trial Successfully Resolves NASA-TR.W D~ipute, Le-
gal Times, Sept. 6, 1982, at 13 (mini-trial allowed amicable and speedy settlement of
highly technical government contract disputes).
116. Under the shortened jury procedure each side takes one hour to present its
case. Jug Trials Can Save Time and Money, BUSINESS WK., July 20, 1981, at 166. "No
witnesses can be called, but each side is permitted to make an opening statement,
submit a summary of the evidence that would be used in a full trial. . . and deliver a
closing statement." Id. The jurors are drawn from the regular prospective jury list.
Id. Use of this procedure in Cleveland has resulted in a 90% settlement rate. Id.
117. For a discussion of the mini-trial, see note 115 supra.
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ments, the parties, who had refused a proposal for traditional arbitra-
tion, agreed to an experimental "mini-trial." That concept allowed
for six weeks of expedited discovery, followed by an exchange of briefs
and a two-day trial attended by top management.""8 Each side
presented its case before a retired federal judge who served as moder-
ator and agreed to issue a non-binding opinion should the parties fail
to settle. In TRW's case that did not prove necessary; management
settled within a half-hour after the close of the hearing, saving several
million dollars in legal fees.' 19
Similar efforts to foreshorten or foreswear litigation by use of ex-
perimental mediation techniques have occurred in the environmental
area. In a recent dispute with environmentalists over the siting of a
uranium milling and mining plant in Saquache County, Colorado,
mediation saved perhaps seventy to seventy-five percent of the funds
it might have expended in traditional litigation leaving both sides sat-
isfied with the mediation process.'
20
The success of these mediation alternatives has led to a variety of
experimental efforts to reduce formal litigation. One district court
required the parties in a complex antitrust case to secure an outside
observer to prepare daily summaries of the trial testimony and evi-
dence so as to expedite the trial, and, collaterally, to facilitate settle-
ment.' 2' At least two corporations, one profit, 2 2 the other non-
118. Green, Marks & Olson, Setthg Large Case Littation: An Alternate Approach,
11 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 493, 502-06 (1978).
119. TRW has used the mini-trial concept in contract disputes as well. In a
dispute between the National Aeronautical Space Agency (NASA) and Space Com-
munications Agency regarding the production of a tracking and data relay satellite
system in which TRW was the principal subcontractor, a "minitrial" procedure was
used with great success. See Johnson, Masri & Oliver, Mini-trzal Successfully Resolves
NASA-TRW Dispute, Legal Times, Sept. 6, 1982, at 13. In that trial, no judge or
neutral party was used because of the complex technical character of the dispute.
Even so, a successful settlement was reached. Id. at 17. The authors felt that the fact
that top management was involved in the discussions was a key feature in the success-
ful resolution, as was the fact that sufficient discovery occurred such that the parties
were able to make a realistic assessment of their situation. Id.
120. For a discussion of the Homestake Mediation, see Watson & Danielson,
Environmental Med atzon, 15 NAT. RESOURCEs LAW. 687, 712-14 (1983) (reviewing and
assessing the Homestake mediation from both company and conservationalist per-
spectives); Lempert, Lawyers Sans Armor Resolve Environmental Clash, Legal Times, May
24, 1982, at 1, col. 2. See also Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability
Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1, 1-4 (1981).
121. See Southern Pac. Communications Co. v. American Tel. & Tel., 556 F.
Supp. 825, 1098-99 (D.D.C. 1982).
122. EnDispute, A Washington, D.C. corporation begun in 1982 provides serv-
ices such as designing mini-trials, providing a roster of mediators for "private trials,"
and offering consultation to attorneys pursuing alternatives to litigation. See Pollock,
The Alternate Route, AM. LAW, Sept. 1983, at 70; T. Lewin, Setthng Disputes Without
Ltigation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1982 at Dl, col. 1.
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profit, 23 have been spawned to foster commercial use of these litiga-
tion-shortening devices. Indeed, even the federal government has be-
gun to introduce mediation techniques into the administrative
rulemaking process in an effort to reduce the amount of "after the
fact" litigation over new rules by involving interested parties in the
early stages of the rulemaking process.
124
The expansion of legal-related jobs in modern technological soci-
ety is cause for social concern. 125 While one cannot preclude the par-
ticipation of lawyers in legislative advocacy, public-policy formation,
or business planning, one should seek to prevent functional monopoli-
zation of these fields by attorneys. We must not forget that other
cultures, even capitalist cultures, rarely require lawyers in these activ-
ities. The professional monopoly should be vindicated only where it
is necessary to the effective fulfillment of a client's business. For in-
stance, much probate and real estate work for the middle class can be
adequately performed by real estate brokers, title agents and bank
trust officers. 126
Some might claim that this contraction of the professional mo-
nopoly will escalate, rather than reduce, the litigation explosion. This
view is based on the premise that different players in the sport of
litigation will result in more litigation. This possibility should not be
ignored. Nonetheless, a benefit from any breakdown in the profes-
sional monopoly will likely be a shift to informalizing disputes-at
least as regards cases involving simple issues of fact.
Other approaches to the litigation explosion warrant explora-
tion. Efforts should be made to simplify laws so as to remove the need
123. The Center for Public Resources, located in New York City, is a clearing-
house for information on alternatives for the resolution of business disputes. Since
1982, they have provided prominent retired judges and attorneys to serve as
factfinders, mediators, or consultants in private trials and mini-trials. 68 A.B.A. J.
1065 (1982).
124. See ACUS Recommendation No. 82-4, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,701-10 (1982) (pro-
cedure for rulemaking by negotiation); Harter, Negottiating Regulations: A Cure for Mal-
atce, 71 GEO. L.J. 1 (1982); Simon, US Tris Alternatives to Litigation, Nat'l L.J., June
27, 1983, at I (noting mediation experiments by Merit Systems Protection Board and
regulatory negotiation procedures by the EPA and FAA).
125. For a discussion of the recent proliferation of lawyers, see notes 28-41 and
accompanying text, supra.
126. In the estate planning field, bank trust departments have been constrained
in the range of their services although "in certain areas, such as the drafting of lan-
guage for use in wills and trusts, trust institutions have at least as much expertise as
members of the legal profession." Johnson, Legal Malpractice in Estate Plannig-Peril-
ous Times Ahead for the Practitioner, 67 IowA L. REV. 629, 703 (1982). See also Hyrne,
Unauthoried Practice in Estate Planning and Admnilstration: A Mild and Temperate Dissent,
29 U. FLA. L. REV. 647, 656-58 (1977). See generally Berl, Estate Plannihg-Whose Sa-
cred Domain? , 9 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1800-06 (1975).
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for complex legal interpretation. For example, minor changes in pro-
bate law could remove all but the most complex estates from judicial
purview. The morass of government regulation should be scourged
with an Occam's razor honed to select the simpler regulatory
alternatives.
Opportunities for resolving disputes without the need for an ad-
versary proceeding should be pursued. In England, Citizen's Advice
Bureaux advise laypersons in dealing with rules and regulations
spawned by the welfare state. Staffed by non-lawyers, they refer per-
sons to legal aid attorneys where necessary. Often, however, the lay
staff can resolve disputes between citizens and the bureaucracy with-
out the need of legal intervention. 127 In contrast, the typical Ameri-
can response to complaints by the citizenry has been increased
government subsidy of lawyers. This appeal for more legions of law-
yers is misplaced. The need for intermediate solutions such as the
Citizens Advice Bureaux is clear. Their existence would diminish
some of the need for professional legal intervention in social disputes.
Some have questioned the effect of efficiency measures such as
those described in this article in terms of fairness, suggesting that jus-
tice has been subordinated to efficiency goals,1 28 leading to a "second-
class justice" for parties to informal dispute resolution.1 2 9 These con-
cerns are clearly not without foundation. On the other hand, effi-
ciency does not always undermine justice. Indeed, as this essay
suggests, justice delayed is often justice denied. Finding the balance
between efficiency and fairness values is the conundrum of modern
judicial administration and the challenge which those concerned with
justice in our complex society must meet.
127. For a critical discussion of the Citizens Advice Bureaux programs, see
Burwin, Citizen's Advice Bureaux-There Is Such a Thing as Cheap Legal Advice, 14
BRACTON L.J. 60 (1981); Sloviter, Let's Look at Cittzen's Advice Bureaux, 65 A.B.A. J.
567 (1979). There are 750 Bureaux in England. Id.
128. Shetreet, The Admzinstration of Justice: Practical Problems, Value Conf icts and
Changing Concepts, 13 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 52, 68 (1979).
129. See notes 91-96 and accompanying text supra.
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